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Abstract Whether it is morally acceptable to offer
rehabilitation by CNS-intervention to criminals as a
condition for early release constitutes an important
neuroethical question. Bomann-Larsen has recently
suggested that such interventions are unacceptable if
the offered treatment is not narrowly targeted at the
behaviour for which the criminal is convicted. In this
article it is argued that Bomann-Larsen’s analysis of
the morality of offers does not provide a solid base for
this conclusion and that, even if the analysis is as-
sumed to be correct, it still does not follow that vol-
untary rehabilitation schemes targeting behaviour
beyond the act for which a criminal is convicted are
inappropriate.
Keywords Bomann-Larsen . Inappropriate offers .
Neurotechnological treatment . Rehabilitation
Introduction
The use of psychopharmacological methods—or other
methods with a direct impact on the central nervous
system (CNS)—as an instrument to improve behav-
iour which is “medically unremarkable but socially
undesirable”1, such as the behaviour of violent crimi-
nals, constitutes a highly controversial issue in modern
neuroethics. As Farah has recently emphasized, psycho-
pharmacological research has identified a link between
impulsive violence and seretonergic abnomalities in
criminals; and SSRIs (Selective Serotonin Reuptake
Inhibitors) have been tried with some success as a
treatment for aggressive behaviour.2 Assuming that
CNS-interventions do in fact turn out to be helpful,
would it be morally acceptable to use forced interven-
tions on violent criminals in the criminal justice system?
Or, as a somewhat less controversial question, would it
be acceptable to offer such interventions to criminals as
a condition of early release? Questions such as these
certainly deserve much more attention than they have so
far received. However, an important contribution to the
discussion of the latter question has recently been pre-
sented by Bomann-Larsen in a volume of this journal.3
What concerns Bomann-Larsen is the question as to
under which circumstances voluntary rehabilitation by
Neuroethics (2013) 6:79–83
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1 See M. J. Farah, “Emerging Ethical Issues in Neuroscience”, in
W. Glannon (ed.), Defining Right and Wrong in Brain Science,
New York: Dana Press, [2], p. 26.
2 M. J. Farah, ibid. p. 27.
3 L. Bomann-Larsen, “Voluntary Rehabilitation? On Neurotech-
nological Behavioural Treatment, Valid Consent and (In)appro-
priate Offers”, Neuroethics, Online First, 18 March [1].
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CNS-interventions offered as an alternative to incar-
ceration is justified. This question naturally leads her
into considerations of the formal criteria for informed
consent. What she convincingly argues is that even
though a criminal’s decision to accept (or reject) reha-
bilitation instead of imprisonment is taken under co-
ercive circumstances, the criminal nevertheless does
have the sovereign authority to consent. However,
though this view in itself seems quite permissive, and
even though Bomann-Larsen ends her article by holding
that it can be seen as delivering an argument in favour of
voluntary rehabilitation by CNS-interventions, the
major part of the article consists of considerations of
how the use of such interventions should be constrained.
More precisely, what she suggests is that rehabilitative
treatment “should not go beyond what is necessary in
order to correct the behaviour for which the criminal is
imprisoned” (p. 11). Thus, even though treatment by
CNS-interventions is acceptable, it should be very nar-
rowly targeted. How does she reach this conclusion?
The answer is that in her view, in order for a consent to
be normatively valid, the subject must not only have the
sovereign authority to consent but the offer-giver must
also be in the right normative position to make the offer.
It is the latter clause that provides the background for the
view that only narrowly targeted types of treatment are
acceptable. Simply put, the argument in favour of this
conclusion can be summarized in the following way: A)
An offer is wrong in itself if it is made by someone who
does not stand in the right normative position, vis-à-vis
the other, to make it. B) The state does not stand in the
right normative position vis-à-vis the criminal if it offers
rehabilitative treatment that goes beyond the behaviour
for which the criminal is convicted. Therefore: It is
wrong for the state to offer rehabilitative treatment that
goes beyond the behaviour for which the criminal is
convicted. Now, though we believe that many will be
sympathetic to Bomann-Larsen’s conclusion, it never-
theless seems to me not to be convincingly sustained. At
least, so we shall argue in the following. Let us consider
each of the two premises in turn.
Premise A
Is it plausible to hold that some offers are wrong in
themselves? That there are some coercive offers that
strike us as wrong is indisputable. As Bomann-Larsen
suggests, most of us would certainly be appalled by
the offer “I will pay for medical help for your
(otherwise dying) child if I get to have sex with
you”. As she also observes, there are some options
which B would be wrong to offer A, but which
are not wrong of C to offer D. “If you stop
gambling, I will stay with you, but if you do not
quit, I will have to leave you” is an offer which
might well be made by the wife of a gambling
husband but which cannot be appropriately made
by anyone else. And “I’ll pay your bill (at this
expensive restaurant) if you help in cleaning my
house” might be a kind offer if made to a student
in need of extra money, but would perhaps seem
highly inappropriate if made to a business associ-
ate. What Bomann-Larsen suggests is that for an
offer to be appropriate it must be made by some-
one who is in the right normative position vis-á-vis
the other, and that some offers are inappropriate
tout court because no one is in the right normative
position to make them (e.g., in the dying-child
example). However, Bomann-Larsen’s observations
give rise to two comments.
First, it is correct that there are some offers which
are inappropriate if made by A to B, but fully accept-
able if made by C to D. However, there are also offers
which it would be acceptable for A to make to B in
one situation but unacceptable if made by A to B in
another. For instance “I’ll pay your bill if you’ll have a
beer with me” may be a highly dubious offer if A
makes it to B who is an alcoholic and who cannot stop
drinking once he has had the first beer. At a later point
in time, if B has overcome his alcoholic problems, the
same offer may be regarded as unproblematic (or even
generous). Whether an offer strikes us as appropriate
or not is—as is the case in many other speech acts
performed in our daily life—a highly context-sensitive
matter. The inappropriateness of an offer in a particu-
lar situation may sometimes be the result of habit or
mere tradition and it may well be that, on closer
reflection, it is hard to see that this offer constitutes a
genuine moral problem (perhaps we are just not used
to this kind of offer). In other cases a particular offer
may constitute a genuine moral problem. Thus, as
when dealing with other highly context-sensitive
issues, we should be careful not to regard our imme-
diate moral judgements as offering a firm ground for a
final ethical assessment. On the contrary, it seems
reasonable to engage in more thorough considerations
of what it is that makes some offers wrong (if they
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really are wrong). This kind of standard moral philo-
sophical reflection may help us to get a more firm
ground for the assessment of offers (and may lead us
to revise some of our more immediate and sometimes
even powerful judgements).
However, when it comes to arguments as to
why some offers are wrong, Bomann-Larsen has
little to offer. All she says is that some offers
constitute a violation of the other’s “claim to mor-
al respect” and that the other is not being recog-
nized as a “moral equal” (p. 9). But it is far from
obvious what this precisely means and, therefore,
also questionable whether this sort of argument
can provide a criterion for distinguishing between
appropriate and inappropriate offers (which, after
all, is the point of the analysis). Consider, for
instance, the following two types of offer: “I’ll
help you solve your minor problem, it you give
me a little money” and “I’ll help you solve your
major problem, if you give me a lot of money”.
While the first offer seems close to the kind of
transaction which Bomann-Larsen regards as mor-
ally acceptable (p. 9) the second has a shape
which she clearly finds inappropriate (note: this
is a version of her example “I will help you out
of the water if you give me all your money”).4
But in a move from the former kind of offer to the
latter, involving slight changes in the magnitude of
the problem and the amount of money, does it
make sense to say that somewhere we reach a
point where the person involved is no longer trea-
ted as an equal? And if so, where should the line
be drawn?5 Though we will not here pursue these
questions more closely, they seem to us at the least
to indicate that the suggested criterion for distinguishing
between appropriate and inappropriate offers is very
weak. However, this fact becomes important when it is
kept in mind that the point is to contribute with answers
to questions such as precisely what sorts of CNS-
intervention it is acceptable to offer as part of voluntary
rehabilitation schemes.
Second, as a further point it might be questioned
whether it is at all plausible to hold that some offers
are wrong in themselves.6 Are there some types of
offer which it is always wrong to make? As men-
tioned, Bomann-Larsen seems to believe that some
offers—such as “I will pay for medical help for your
(otherwise dying) child if I get to have sex with
you”—are always wrong. Now, we think that the main
reason why we regard this offer as morally unac-
ceptable is that there is another morally preferable
option open to the offer-giver, namely, simply to
help without requiring anything in return.7 But if
that is so, then our judgement might change if the
context in which the offer is made leaves out the
possibility of other (and better) options for the
offer-giver. Suppose that the offer-giver’s only mo-
tive is to assist the child, that the only way he can
provide money to do so is by having sex with the
parent (because some other person has offered
money to someone who has had sex with the
parent) and that for some reason it is not possible
for the offer-giver to explain this to the parent,
would the offer then still be morally abhorrent?
Now, it might well be objected that this example
constitutes an extremely hypothetical scenario that
can only be dreamt up by absurdly imaginative
philosophers. And indeed this is correct: the ex-
ample is highly hypothetical (which is precisely
why this kind of offer in real life would probably
always be wrong). However, it may nevertheless help us
when it comes to considering the wrongness of such
offers. If there were no other way in which the offer-
giver could possibly assist the dying child than by
making the offer, then this offer no longer strikes us as
morally inappropriate. In fact, I tend to believe that it
would be wrong not to make the offer and thereby let the
child die.
Without engaging further in this discussion, we be-
lieve that these considerations underscore the point
made above, namely, that more needs to be said on the
4 Bomann-Larsen presents an example of the second type of
offer—“I will help you out of the water if you give me all your
money”—which she regards as clearly inappropriate.
5 To avoid misunderstandings, the point is not to suggest that a
justification should be rejected if it does not provide absolutely
precise limits but, more modestly, to indicate that a “claim of
moral respect” constitutes a very (and for the purpose of the
present discussion unsatisfactory) vague criterion.
7 Probably, our intuitions are also affected by the magnitude of
what is required in return. We are more shocked if what is
required is sex than if it is a cup of coffee. But it strikes me that
it would be wrong even to require a cup of coffee in return of
assisting the dying child.
6 What Bomann-Larsen says is that an “offer itself is a wrong-
ing” (p. 9). But clearly the point is that some offers are wrong in
themselves. Otherwise the analysis would not provide a basis
for the suggested appropriateness-constraints on rehabilitation
offers.
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justification of the view that some offers are simply
wrong. We do not believe that Bomann-Larsen in her
general analyses of offers has succeeded in underpin-
ning premise A in a way that provides a solid base for
drawing conclusions on such detailed matters as how
offers of CNS-interventions should be constrained.
Premise B
Leaving the general analysis of the morality of offers
aside, we can now turn to the more narrow consider-
ations of the appropriateness of rehabilitation offers in
the criminal justice system as expressed in premise B.
Should we accept that the state does not stand in the
right moral position vis-á-vis the criminal—and hence
that it acts wrongly—if it offers treatment that is
targeted beyond the behaviour for which the criminal
is convicted?
Let us arguendo assume that we accept the conclusion
of the general analysis of the significance of the moral
position in which an offer-giver stands relatively to the
party to whom the offer is made. The question that arises
then is: How do we determine what constitutes the right
moral position of the state towards a criminal? What
Bomann-Larsen says is that there are some acts for
which we are responsible to the state and must answer
for to the state and, furthermore, that “what citizens are
answerable for to the state determines the scope of
behavioural conditions for which the state can appropri-
ately offer convicts treatment” (p. 10). This is the reason
why the state should only offer treatment of the behav-
iour for which a criminal is convicted. As she underlines,
not all wrongs are “public wrongs” and “not all socially
undesirable behaviours are the state’s concern” (p. 10).
However, this argument prompts two challenges.
First, even if we accept what seems to be the
basic idea of Bomann-Larsen’s suggestion, namely,
that the state should not make offers which have
nothing to do with what constitutes the proper
function of the state, it remains unclear why the
scope of this function should be determined on the
ground of what citizens are answerable for to the
state. Why not hold that the proper function of the
state and, more narrowly, the purpose of the crim-
inal justice system is to protect citizens or to
prevent crimes? And, therefore, that it would be
fully acceptable to offer CNS-interventions as part
of medical experiments which can be used in the
development of treatment of future criminals?8
Surely, future crimes do constitute “socially unde-
sirable behaviours” and Bomann-Larsen cannot ob-
ject that this is not the “state’s concern”. Thus, it
remains unclear why she explicitly rejects it as
inappropriate to offer a criminal to take part in
medical experiments. What we are saying, it should
be noted, is not that such offers are acceptable, but
simply that it is hard to see that Bomann-Larsen has
succeeded in rejecting the plausibility of such offers
on the ground of her considerations of what consti-
tutes the “state’s concern”.
Second, even if one accepts that the state can-
not appropriately make offers concerning the ben-
efit of others and that it is only appropriate to
make an offer which involves treatment of the
criminal himself, it is unclear why offers should
be limited to treatment that concerns the very
behaviour for which the criminal is convicted.
Suppose that a criminal is convicted for crime
C1 but that there are strong reasons to believe
that he will in the near future commit crime C2.
Why then would it be acceptable to offer treat-
ment that would prevent a future instance of C1
but inappropriate to offer treatment targeted at prevent-
ing C2? Surely, C2 is the “state’s concern” to the very
same extent as is C1. Obviously, there may be difficul-
ties in predicting future crimes. A standard objection in
the traditional discussion of preventive punishment of
dangerous offenders concerns the problem of making
reliable predictions of criminal behaviour (that is, there
will be a high number of “false positives”).9 However,
this would be the case both with regard to C1 and C2.
And, more importantly, what Bomann-Larsen is consid-
ering is the in-principle justification of constraints on
CNS-intervention; not the present practical limitations.
Thus, in sum, even if one accepts the more
general analysis of the appropriateness constraints
9 See, for instance, A. von Hirsch and L. Maher, “Should
Penal Rehabilitation be Revived?”, in A. von Hirsch and A.
Ashworth (eds.), Principled Sentencing, Oxford: Hart Pub-
lishing, [3].
8 Another possibility—if one prefers a retributivist outlook to a
consequentialist preventive position—is to suggest that the pur-
pose of the criminal justice system is to distribute just deserts
and that it, therefore, would be inappropriate for the state to
offer treatment as an alternative to punishment (that is, if one
assumes that such a treatment is not a punishment and that a
shortened period of imprisonment would violate the retributivist
proportionality constraint).
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on offers and Bomann-Larsen’s view on what can
properly be regarded as the “state’s concern”, it
remains unclear why one should accept that the
state cannot make appropriate offers of treatment
that goes beyond the behaviour for which the
criminal is convicted.
Conclusion
Bomann-Larsen indisputably deserves credit for hav-
ing directed attention to the issue of voluntary reha-
bilitation by CNS-intervention. The issue has so far
been only tentatively dealt with and some of the com-
ments made have been over-simplistic. However,
though Bomann-Larsen offers a detailed and thoughtful
analysis, what we have suggested is that her conclusions
are not persuasively underpinned. More precisely, what
we have argued above is, firstly, that the general analysis
of the morality of offers does not provide a solid base for
the distinction between appropriate and inappropriate
offers; secondly, that it is questionable whether
there are offers which are wrong in themselves;
and, finally and most importantly, that even if one
accepts the general analysis it remains unclear why
voluntary CNS-interventions should be reserved only
for treatment of the behaviour for which a criminal is
convicted.
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